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Showing posts with label Friedrich Hayek. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Friedrich Hayek. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 01, 2026

The Temporal Problem of Biological Relativity and Its Relation to Hayek's Views of Civilizational Development

In his book, Dance to the Tune of Life: Biological Relativity (D. Noble 2017), Denis Noble presents the principle of biological relativity “as simply that there is no privileged level of causation in biology; living organisms are multi-level open stochastic systems in which the behaviour at any level depends on higher and lower levels and cannot be fully understood in isolation” (2017, 160). This characterization was preceded by Noble’s paper, “A theory of biological relativity: no privileged level of causation” (2012) and followed by the popular science book, with brother Raymond Noble, Understanding Living Systems (R. Noble and Noble 2023). An additional point made in the paper is that “Each level provides the boundary conditions under which the processes at lower levels operate. Without boundary conditions, biological functions would not exist” (D. Noble 2012, 58).

The evidence for biological relativity is strong, and I have no grounds for criticism—it seems to be right. However, it prompts the question, “If there are levels (the Nobles prefer nesting, or inner/outer levels to higher/lower), don’t the inner levels precede the development of the outer ones in time?” And, if the answer is, “Yes,” don’t we have to wonder if the outer level is actively constructed by the low level and, hence, agreed to by it in a way that we have little or no concept of what “agree” means?

In Hayek we see a similar problem where he argues that civilization creates reason:

Man did not adopt new rules of conduct because he was intelligent. He became intelligent by submitting to new rules of conduct. [italics in original] (Hayek 2021, 522)

Hayek seems to deny that developing new rules of conduct involves trial-and-error learning, which requires, in Popper’s terms, the creation of a theory and its testing followed by error elimination, demanding intelligence. Elaine Sternberg finds a similar problem when she writes:

Unlike the Ferguson formula of ‘human action but not human design’, the alternate formula—’the unintended coordination of intentional action’—clearly differentiates orders from their elements. It therefore also helps clarify the relation of spontaneous order and reason. (2021)

The creation of civilization requires reason to create a new theory, to enact it, and then to evaluate the results. While Hayek is correct that civilization is not designed in toto, incremental uses of reason, not necessarily with good results, produces civilization.

To conclude, I believe that both in biological causation and in civilizational development there is a bootstrapping process in which the current base must, in some way, produce and/or accept the new constraints that then establish the new base upon which, if successful, the next leg is built. This process may be expressed in terms of Popper’s tetradic schema, P1->TT->EE->P2: problem situation one leads to tentative theories followed by error elimination producing problem situation two. The implication that a teleological process is at work seems inescapable.

Bibliography

Hayek, Friedrich A. 2021. Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy. Edited by Jeremy Shearmur. XIX. The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, volume XIX. The University of Chicago Press.

Noble, Denis. 2012. “A Theory of Biological Relativity: No Privileged Level of Causation.” Interface Focus 2 (1): 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2011.0067.

Noble, Denis. 2017. Dance to the Tune of Life: Biological Relativity. Cambridge University Press.

Noble, Raymond, and Denis Noble. 2023. Understanding Living Systems. Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, Elaine. 2021. “The Power and Pervasiveness of Spontaneous Order.” Column. Econlib Articles, July 5. https://www.econlib.org/library/columns/y2021/sternbergspontaneousorder.html.

 

Wednesday, September 24, 2025

R.I.P. Philip Benesch

Sent to members of the late Mark Nottorno's The Future of Science and Open Society online discussion group:

I find this news [of Philip Benesch's death] particularly distressing, as Philip was one of the least dogmatic "critical rationalists." As one of the few in this group who was respectful of me and my views, I periodically communicated with him about ideas he might find interesting.

Philip believed he had detected a change in Popper's view of the social sciences around 1964—a view Mark disputed—for which I suggested Hayek's "The Theory of Complex Phenomena," a paper that was included in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy: In Honor of Karl R. Popper, as the source. I even suggested we might co-author a paper on that, but Philip suggested he was a poor co-author, and it never came to anything.

More recently, based on my rereading of Popper's Medawar Lecture and examining Barry Smith's criticism of the action axiom, I had suggested that Philip read my article on mises.org [Mises and Popper on Action] about the apparent agreement between Popper and Mises on the action axiom—Popper's expression of it being more generalized—and received a positive response. Finally, I suggested on my blog that Popper, in the Medawar Lecture, had in fact expressed views that could only be seen as aprioristic [Karl Popper, Self-Evident Truth, and Certain Knowledge], and Philip responded, "I think you are right."

I was thinking of asking Philip to work with me on a response to Reinhard Neck's session on Jeremy's last online conference, a session that Professor Neck had already given in Vienna at the "Adverse Allies" workshop; but that is clearly not going to happen.

R.I.P. Philip—I'll miss you!

Monday, April 14, 2025

Mises and Mont Pèlerin 1947

Although Mises was not an anarchist, he was clearly unwavering in principle concerning laissez-faire—he was better than "the rest." From Bruce Caldwell's Mont Pèlerin 1947:

General discussion waited until the evening session [of "Free Enterprise or Competitive Order"—session 1]. That event might have been retitled “free enterprise versus the competitive order,” or more simply “Mises versus the rest,” though both Hazlitt and Miller made brief comments in support of Mises’s positions, and “the rest” did not always agree with one another. Mises had some justification to feel a little prickly. After all, in a session posing a choice between free enterprise and a competitive order, it might have been fitting to have had among the opening speakers at least one person who was willing to defend the former. In any event, Mises’s defense of laissez - faire was predictably direct and pithy: most of the problems that had been identified had government actions as their root cause, so their solution was to get it out of the way. For most of those attending the conference, this simple advice was unsatisfactory. People wanted to discuss alternative policies, to find out which ones might best cohere with a liberal vision, not the reasons why policies were unnecessary. Both Hayek and Robbins tried to intervene in various ways, mostly to clarify the various positions under discussion, but at times things got testy. This was probably the session at which Mises “stood up, announced to the assembly ‘You’re all a bunch of socialists,’ and stomped out of the room," though that is not recorded in the minutes. (p. 47)

Friday, July 30, 2021

Ludwig von Mises on Society and Cooperation

 Mises argues for liberalism in ways reminiscent of arguments for socialism:

"Society is the union of human beings for the better exploitation of the natural conditions of existence; in its very conception it abolishes the struggle between human beings and substitutes the mutual aid which provides the essential motive of all members united in an organism. Within the limits of society there is no struggle, only peace. Every struggle suspends in effect the social community. Society as a whole, as organism, does fight a struggle for existence against forces inimical to it. But inside, as far as society has absorbed individuals completely, there is only collaboration. For society is nothing but collaboration" (Socialism, p 316 of Yale University Press edition/281 of Liberty Classics edition).

This is a beautiful passage and part of Mises's evolutionary arguments. Your world view determines whether you think the ideas of Marx or Mises will generate this happy situation.

All of us in society, even if we are "competing," are engaged in the cooperative effort to discover those products and processes that are best, a view Friedrich Hayek later elaborated on in his essay "Competition as a Discovery Procedure".

Saturday, February 06, 2021

Karl Popper's "Virus"

 In The Poverty of Historicism, while talking about the uncertainty of progress, Karl Popper wrote "For we cannot exclude the logical possibility, say, of a bacterium or virus that spreads a wish for Nirvana" (1957, p 157). What is interesting is that Popper was infected with this virus—initially, Marxism, gradually decreasing in virility to socialism and then interventionism.

In 1914, at the age of 12, Popper read Edward Bellamy's utopian novel, Looking Backward:2000-1887 (Hacohen, 2000, p 67-68); and, without guidance, it is hard to believe that he would have been able to engage with it critically. In fact, in his intellectual autobiography, he criticizes himself for his uncritical acceptance of Marxism (1982, 33-34). In that same book he demonstrates that while into his seventies he has still not rid himself of the disease, writing "... if there could be such a thing as socialism combined with personal liberty, I would be a socialist still" (36).

As far as I know, Popper, while sometimes mentioning free markets positively, never condemned socialism for its negative economic consequences that have resulted each time it has been tried. Even the voluntary socialist experiments of the 19th century (e.g. by adherents of Owenism in the U.S.) and of Zionists in Israel have been, if not outright failures, difficult to sustain. Perhaps his rejection of economism—the idea that economic welfare is a guide for social policy and a characteristic he identified in Marx's writing— led him to believe that such a criticism was unnecessary and would reduce him to Marx's level.

The failure of Popper to embrace the economics of Mises and Hayek has led to the perpetuation of error, most visibly in the person of George Soros, and put humanity at risk of another dark age. Edward Bellamy would be astonished.

Hacohen, M. H. (2000). Karl Popper — The Formative Years, 1902-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Popper, K. R. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon Press.

Popper, K. R. ([1976] 1982). Unended Quest. La Salle: Open Court.


Saturday, December 15, 2018

Are Societal Structures Really "… the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design?"


This phrase from Adam Ferguson (quote in context here) is bandied about quite a bit by supporters of markets and, specifically, in the context of Friedrich Hayek's views of markets and society. The phrase brings to mind the inductivist view that science proceeds first by observations–"just observe." However, in the case of creating social structures, "just act." This formulation can lead one to think that in science any random observation can lead to knowledge, or in society, any action will contribute to the spontaneous order. Such thinking denigrates the individual and minimizes such achievements as Newton's laws of motion and Mises's work on socialism's calculation problem.

If we accept Mises's definition of human action, "purposeful behavior" (Human Action, p 11), we take it that each action is rational and aimed at a certain end (this is not to say that impulsive or instinctual actions involve thought processes, but that the ones that concern us in economics and social interaction do). Therefore we can say that each action is designed by the individual for a specific purpose. When individuals act with a purpose in mind they are supported by the entire background of biological and societal evolution that preceded them. For that reason, actions are not random but are stochasticly targeted in the sense Denis Noble describes in Dance to the Tune of Life (194-197), varying only part of the theoretical structure.

In acting, each person impinges upon the plans of others. As each person adjusts their plans to mesh with others' their actions produce effects that feed back into the system, producing new effects unanticipated by the original actors. These new effects produce plan revisions, and so on. The pattern is the same as Karl Popper's tetradic schema:

P1 → TT → EE → P2
 Where P1 is the initial problem state, TT is a tentative solution or theory, EE is the error-elimination process applied to the theory, and P2 represents the new problem state that has been generated by the process.

This concise representation is simply that of a Darwinian or evolutionary approach to knowledge, reflecting the iterative process of markets that is so foreign to the state and political governance.

New knowledge is created at the frontier by trial-and-error based upon what we currently believe to be true. Individuals produce the mutations to our theories–scientific and social–that make progress possible. These mutations are tested against reality and retained or discarded based on the results. Sometimes, when problems with an accepted theory become too great science takes a step back, and we discover we "know what ain't so."

At this moment in history, it appears that what we are in such a position with economics and society. In economics we are in the grips of the neoclassical synthesis, which provides an intellectual argument for the state, an institution that already resists falsification through power and violence. In society the failed arguments of natural rights have opened the floodgates to identity politics and the intellectually sterile ad hoc strategy of resistance to it. It would seem that we are heading for a giant reset in which one hopes for a rethinking of the whole project of governance resulting in institutions developed through the trial-and-error of what I have called evolutionary liberalism. Only then might we have Peace on Earth.

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Evolutionary Liberalism

Although this blog is named "The Radical Liberal," my thinking has taken a decidedly evolutionary turn. In a sense that turn is even more radical, but I think that it is time for me to attach a more descriptive term than "radical" to this liberalism—"evolutionary."

The characteristics of evolutionary liberalism are that it embraces universal Darwinism and takes trial-and-error, evolutionary learning as the only way forward for humanity. It argues that the pursuit of such learning is inhibited by what people call "government" or "the state"—that the state is itself a failed experiment.

The social embodiment of this learning process is what is generally called "the market," discussed previously in my paper "Let Go and Let the Market," referenced in another post on this blog. The ideas in that paper have been developed further, and money profit identified as the selection mechanism for societal evolution.

The philosophy of evolutionary liberalism is heavily influenced by the scientific philosophy of Karl R. Popper (not his generally-flawed political and economic thinking) and the economics of the Austrian school, as elucidated by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. These thinkers are influences and there is no argument that they would agree with or support evolutionary liberalism. This is not a project to argue about what they thought, but to use their work as inspiration for ever bolder conjectures.

I am quite sure that many people are circling around these ideas, including Matt Ridley and Daniel Dennett. Although they are far more well known and knowledgeable than I, they seem to have missed the basic problem of the state and its "solution." When it comes to them, or other widely-read thinkers, we might have a renaissance of true liberalism.

Contra Hayek, Cultural Evolution IS Darwinian

In Hayek's The Fatal Conceit (1988) there is a section titled "The Mechanism of Cultural Evolution Is Not
Darwinian." Within the section Hayek takes the position that Darwinian theory applies only to biological and not cultural evolution. He writes that "cultural evolution simulates Lamarkism" (25).

However, when we take an abstract view of Darwinism—variation, selection, and retention—we see that Hayek is mistaken. The problem of Lamarkism is not that characteristics are acquired, as characteristics resulting from mutations are also acquired; but that there is no mechanism of retention. Rather than DNA, it is the institutions of society that pass on the mutations of society—the new ideas, technologies, and customs. The mechanism of cultural retention is what Karl Popper called World 3 (1972).

The mention of World 3 prompts the suggestion that DNA is also a World 3 phenomenon created by processes in the cell for purposes of retention. Where this suggestion leads is anybody's guess.

Bibliography

Hayek, F.A., 1988, The Fatal Conceit, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Popper, K.R., 1972, "On the Theory of the Objective Mind" in Objective Knowledge, London, Oxford University Press, 153-190.

Saturday, February 27, 2016

David Sloan Wilson on Evonomics: An Agenda Cloaked in Science



After David Sloan Wilson wrote the article, The Road to Ideology: How Friedrich Hayek Became a Monster, Peter Boettke invited him to give a seminar at the F.A. Hayek Center for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. On February 11, 2016, Wilson presented the seminar, which is summarized here with a link to a video that incorporates a recording of the seminar and the slide presentation. I suggest that those interested in Austrian economics or coming from a non-leftist position watch the presentation as it will give you a clear idea of what we are up against. Make no mistake, Wilson and his comrades at Evonomics are heavy hitters and have an agenda that you won't like. Having listened to the presentation once, I have a few thoughts.

First, Wilson alleges that laissez-faire has its roots in the Christian worldview of universal harmony. Doing so is an attempt to discredit it as mystical and unscientific, and rob it of its roots in the Enlightenment. The reality is that Christianity was the home of top-down, unrelenting authoritarianism until it was tamed by the realization that markets tended to reduce or eliminate the antagonisms between religious groups. The resulting intellectual movement, in which those such as Voltaire argued that religion and aristocracy should be de-emphasized and commerce elevated, was probably more of an influence on Christianity than the other way around (see Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market, p 23).

Wilson goes on to state that progress came from the societal suppression of "disruptive, self-serving behaviors," rather than the realization on the part of individuals that cooperation was to their advantage in achieving goals that would have been difficult or impossible for them on their own (see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, p 143). This view results in a bias toward top-down (coercive) rather than bottom-up (evolutionary) thinking. Wilson is definitely pushing methodological collectivism. He believes societies were successful because they dragooned their members into following the rules, not because they had rules that helped individuals flourish, thereby attracting and keeping members. Group selection is a reality, but only in the context of the feedback of individual selection that makes one group prosper over another.

While wanting to speed up group selection, Wilson fails to realize that the state suppresses selection by bypassing the feedback mechanism of profit and loss, and even imprisons its victims within its boarders, preventing the possibility of "voting with your feet." Failing the latter, there may be an effort for governments to form cartels or impose rules through a world-wide body, eliminating the possibility of selection still further. After all, if there is only one body, we are done with selection. The feedback of money profit and loss in an environment of open competition is superior, and the only objective method I can see that can facilitate group selection.

When watching Wilson's slides you will see that he believes the Earth is being destroyed by human activity. The Evonomics agenda is to reverse that perceived destruction by imposing an "intelligent design," cloaked in science, that has no possibility of effective criticism or reversal--of negative selection. Only by critically developing our own arguments and pointing out that their approach is actually anti-evolution can we succeed in defeating their effort.


Friday, August 31, 2012

The Myth of a (Classical) Liberal or Libertarian Utopia

Cover of
Cover via Amazon
In reading online articles and blogs it is common to find references to a "libertarian utopia."  These references are both supportive and derisive, distorting what I will claim is the idea of true liberalism.  Hayek is even referenced in this Freeman article bemoaning the fact that "we lack a liberal Utopia."  The problem with this phrase first became clear to me when I read the following words:
Contemporary socialists – "light" totalitarians in mindset and vocabulary – go wrong when they imagine that liberals are busily planning the perfect society, the best that is possible in the world, but of opposite sign to their own. [emphasis in original]1
The reality is that there is no liberal Utopia.  Liberalism and its modern-day progeny, libertarianism, are processes rather than destinations.  In the same sense that the scientific process leads to the discovery of laws of nature, liberalism leads to the discovery of that society that best conforms to human values.  Such a society defies planning, as planning implements the values of a small elite.  It also stifles the wide-ranging experimentation – through trial and error – that is necessary to discover the institutions and businesses that are necessary in building a society that supports human values.

Of course, one may wonder, "What are human values?"  I tend to think, as did Ludwig von Mises, that most people prefer prosperity over poverty, freedom over slavery, and life over death.  There are, and always will be, predators who prey on those who live peacefully and productively.  The latter will use freedom to create the cost-effective defenses that maximize the cost of predatory behavior, eventually discarding the unwieldy blunt instrument of the state.

What is needed then is a total commitment to the free market and its concomitant competition as discovery procedure by which society progresses.  There can be no fear of unacceptable outcomes, as outcomes will reflect human values.  Yes, in some areas of the world those outcomes might be repulsive to modern westerners, but eventual progress in those regions is not going to be accelerated by murdering, threatening, or lecturing the population.

What is most important is to embrace the idea that liberalism – the free (or freed) market – is the platform upon which progress depends.  The end state defies prior description, but we can have confidence that it will conform to human values.

*In the body of the post an unmodified reference to "liberal" is a reference to "classical liberal."
1Revel, Jean-François, Last Exit to Utopia, (2009 New York, Encounter Books), 54.
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Monday, April 30, 2012

In Defense of Karl Popper and Piecemeal Social Engineering

Karl Popper in 1990.Karl Popper in 1990. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Karl R. Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of science in the 20th century.  His ideas on inductivism and falsifiability transformed the philosophy of science, creating credibility when he turned his mind to the social sciences.  Over the course of his lifetime he moved from a strong commitment to social democracy to support for liberal democracy, possibly due to the influence of his longtime friend, Friedrich Hayek.

In The Open Society and Its Enemies Popper proposed something he called “piecemeal social engineering.”[1]  In this regime he suggested that governments implement small societal changes and then critically evaluate the results.  He also mentioned that private individuals and businesses were participants in this process saying:
Even a man who opens a new shop, or who reserves a ticket for the theatre, is carrying out a kind of social experiment on a small scale ;  and all our knowledge of social conditions is based on experience gained by making experiments of this kind.[2]
In the context that Popper suggested it most free market advocates would find his view of social engineering to be anathema; but if we view it critically and in the context of Popper’s more abstract ideas, specifically “evolutionary epistemology,” we can come to a different and positive conclusion.

Consider Bryan Magee’s representation of Popper’s view of problem solving in society when he says, “Because he regards living as first and foremost a process of problem-solving he wants societies which are conducive to problem-solving.”[3]  When Popper suggested that liberal democracies could legislate small changes in the societal structure, evaluate the results and either repeal or retain the changes he was arguing against utopian views and for such a society.  As such it was a significant advancement in thinking about societal changes and a sensible argument against all utopian schemes.  Unfortunately, Popper was naïve about the ability of governments, even those of liberal democracies, to evaluate the results of their actions and to learn from them.
Governments are unable to learn from their mistakes for a number of reasons:
  1. The individuals supporting a specific experiment risk citizens’ resources, not their own.
  2. In a mixed economy, government does pay market prices for the resources it consumes, but as a monopoly it forces the populace to pay arbitrary prices for the goods and services it provides.
  3. There is no signal such as profit or loss that can inform the experimenters of their success or failure.  In fact, it is widely suggested that government should undertake projects that are “desired” but that generate losses.
In addition to the inability of governments to learn, they impose their experiments on the entire populace, eliminating the possibility of parallel, competitive experiments through which more progress could be made.
As mentioned earlier, Popper did suggest that businesses could, in effect, also participate in piecemeal social engineering by implementing different business plans and offering revised or different products.  He failed to realize that what seemed to him to be a minor component was in fact the most significant and could accomplish his goal of societal evolution more effectively.
The fact is that businesses in the free market have built-in mechanisms that signal difficulties and facilitate learning:
  1. The individuals involved are risking their own or investors’ resources – resources that are freely given and are at risk in the project.  This risk factor dampens the enthusiasm for projects that appear fantastic or utopian as opposed to realistic.
  2. Businesses charge prices that must reflect customers’ values.
  3. If income minus expenses is negative that signals that the business’s inputs are not creating a value for consumers that justifies the consumption of resources.  The individuals involved must make the decision whether to continue to consume capital or abandon the project.
Businesses are naturally competitive and are generally unable to impose their plans on the population, making it possible for multiple plans to be executed simultaneously across various industries.

Thus, we can say that Popper’s idea – piecemeal experimentation with the expectation of finding problem solutions – was sensible, but his means – governments of liberal democracies – could not accomplish that end.  On the other hand, a society free of government intervention and based on profit and loss has the tools required to accomplish it.

[1] Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume I: The Spell of Plato, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 158.
[2] Ibid, 162.
[3] Magee, Bryan, Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985), 75.
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Thursday, August 13, 2009

What Do We Favor?

I have been reading Jeremy Shearmur's Hayek and After: Hayekian liberalism as a research programme (London, Routledge, 1996) and am struck by the recurring discussion about how Hayek's ideas will or will not produce the result he (Hayek) favors. The amazing thing to me is that he favors any particular results, other than the satisfaction of consumer wants. Hayek is the chief proponent of what may be called "spontaneous order" - market-generated order that appears when no central plan is imposed on the market - and one finds it difficult to reconcile that with the idea that any particular outcome may be preferred. It is this very idea of a preferred outcome, especially when uttered by an economist, that supports the interventionism that Hayek generally rejects. This inability to accept market outcomes, no matter how displeasing they might be to your sensibilities, has led to the acceptance of the state or the invention of extra-market moralities by those who could have known better.

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