R.I.P. Philip Benesch

Sent to members of the late Mark Nottorno's The Future of Science and Open Society online discussion group:

I find this news [of Philip Benesch's death] particularly distressing, as Philip was one of the least dogmatic "critical rationalists." As one of the few in this group who was respectful of me and my views, I periodically communicated with him about ideas he might find interesting.

Philip believed he had detected a change in Popper's view of the social sciences around 1964—a view Mark disputed—for which I suggested Hayek's "The Theory of Complex Phenomena," a paper that was included in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy: In Honor of Karl R. Popper, as the source. I even suggested we might co-author a paper on that, but Philip suggested he was a poor co-author, and it never came to anything.

More recently, based on my rereading of Popper's Medawar Lecture and examining Barry Smith's criticism of the action axiom, I had suggested that Philip read my article on mises.org [Mises and Popper on Action] about the apparent agreement between Popper and Mises on the action axiom—Popper's expression of it being more generalized—and received a positive response. Finally, I suggested on my blog that Popper, in the Medawar Lecture, had in fact expressed views that could only be seen as aprioristic [Karl Popper, Self-Evident Truth, and Certain Knowledge], and Philip responded, "I think you are right."

I was thinking of asking Philip to work with me on a response to Reinhard Neck's session on Jeremy's last online conference, a session that Professor Neck had already given in Vienna at the "Adverse Allies" workshop; but that is clearly not going to happen.

R.I.P. Philip—I'll miss you!

Comment on "The Deutschian Deadend" by Kasra

 "The Deutschian Deadend" by Kasra displays an understanding of Popper and Deutsch different from mine.

In the discussion labelled "False predictions on AI," Kasra states that "In Deutsch’s world, theories always come first" (emphasis in original). However, depending on how closely Deutsch's views mirror Popper's, problems always come first, followed by a theory that is an attempt to solve the problem. Kasra then goes on to argue that collecting data first has led to AI successes, unlike the "theory first" approach. But, again, Kasra is not thinking deeply enough on this issue, at least as I understand it, because humans had problems, then came up with a theory that then caused them to collect and feed this data to an AI system, expecting it to find a pattern. In other words, the problem and the theory drove the data collection that has led to AI systems' successes. Those successes were definitely not driven by atheoretical, indiscriminate data collection.

Karl Popper, Self-Evident Truth, and Certain Knowledge

 I think that by the time Popper gave his Medawar Lecture he was very much in the realm of self-evident truth and certain knowledge, whether he realized it explicitly or not:

The strange thing is that teleology enters the world with adaptation. Organisms are problem-solvers. Organisms seek better conditions. All of these are thoroughly teleological terms. “Better conditions” introduce evaluation. And no doubt organisms value, organisms prefer, organisms like this or that better than something else. We cannot avoid all teleological terms, and we cannot avoid all anthropomorphic terms. (2014, 124)

I take "no doubt" to be a synonym for "certainly," and the matter-of-fact tone of the statement seems to indicate the self-evidence of the assertions.

And then his agreement with Mises expressed in his address to the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1992: "Like myself, [Ludwig von Mises] appreciated that there was some common ground, and he knew that I had accepted his most fundamental theorems and that I greatly admired him for these” (2008, 404).

Professor Reinhard Neck of Klagenfurt presented at the workshop I attended in Vienna from 12.02.24-14.02.24 (Professor Neck's abstract below) and was completely unaware of this quote from the AEA address when I asked him about it and attempted to somehow attribute it to Popper's state of mind in light of Hayek's recent death, but the address was actually given a couple of months previously.

Popper had also argued the irreducibility of biology to chemistry and/or physics due to the issue of purpose in biology.

I conclude that Popper's views as they applied to the physical sciences became increasingly difficult to hold as they applied to the biological and social sciences, and as a good critical rationalist (or evolutionary epistemologist), his views were at least in flux, if not decidedly changed, by the time he gave the Medawar Lecture.

Popper, Karl. 2008. “The Communist Road to Self-Enslavement (1992).” In After the Open Society: Selected Social and Political Writings, edited by Jeremy Shearmur, 402–10. London: Routledge.

Popper, Karl. 2014. “A New Interpretation of Darwinism.” In Karl Popper and the Two New Secrets of Life: Including Karl Popper’s Medawar Lecture 1986 and Three Related Texts, by Hans-Joachim Niemann. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck.

Professor Neck's abstract:

Karl Popper — Interlocutor or Killer of the Vienna Circle and the Austrian School of Economics

In this paper, I investigate the position of Karl Popper’s philosophy vis à vis both the Vienna Circle and the Austrian School of Economics. While Popper has claimed to have killed logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle but communicated with its proponent s, especially Carnap, in a polite and even submissive manner, his relation to Hayek, the most prominent representative of the Vienna School of Economics, was characterized by gratitude and friendship, and he appreciated the methodology of (neoclassical and Austrian) economics as blueprint of his own methodology of the social sciences, especially his situational analysis. We argue that Popper’s relation to both approaches was more ambiguous. His own philosophy of science and epistemology was rather different from and highly incompatible with that of Mises, the early Hayek, and most subsequent Austrian economists, and he even contributed to Hayek’s later renunciation of Austrian praxeology and essentialism and adoption of (at least some) philosophical position s of Critical Rationalism. On the other hand, Popper’s positions in philosophy did not only develop out of his disputes with the Vienna Circle but contained some key elements of its way of doing philosophy, especially the use of formal and clearly formulated arguments and their logical foundations. Hence Popper can be seen as both a critical but friendly discussant of the Vienna Circle’s ideas but only a fellow traveler of the Austrian economists. It can even be argued that those elements of Austrian Economics that seem to be outdated today are quite contrary to Popper’s approach and introducing ideas of Critical Rationalism into Austrian Economics can help the latter gaining more scientific respectability among economists of different persuasion.

The Cruel Twist of Fate: Imagination

Karl Popper suggested that the amoeba, if it has an erroneous theory, will probably forfeit its life; but humans have the capacity for reason, can criticize theories, and discard those that crumble under criticism. But, in a cruel twist of fate, god (metaphorically) furnished us with an imagination that can conjure up that which cannot exist. For that reason we are still forfeiting our lives in defense of erroneous theories.

Comments on "Evolution and Human Behavior" by Gordon Tullock

 I just finished reading Gordon Tullock's essay "Evolution and Human Behavior," which is included in The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, volume 10, Economics without Frontiers, and was surprised by his omission of the idea of valuing in discussing human behavior.

As Mises and Popper pointed out (see Mises and Popper on Action), action implies a valuing—a preference for a new state that may be achieved and is hypothetically better than the current one. Tullock, ignoring this fact, asserts that his landing on the beaches of "Normandy on D plus 7" was predicted by his genes rather than his values—he was, like his fellow soldiers, "genetically programmed to fight for their tribe" (p 168).

This assertion might be plausible for tribes, as they were tightly-knit communities in which all members were organically connected to each other, if not genetically through the common struggle for survival. If one person felt pain, everyone felt pain including the chief. In this position, a threat against one was a threat against all, and the willingness to fight would have been an asset.

Fast forward thousands of years and we have the environment of the nation state. Here, outside our family, we are alone. Our tribe is dispersed, and we rely for our existence on people we do not know that live far from us. Our State hardly knows we exist, although a failure to pay our taxes my bring us to its attention. The State is not organic—when we feel pain there is no pain felt in our legislature or the departments that execute the legislation that is intended to limit our actions. In this environment, how can we be convinced to risk our lives to perpetuate our State?

The answer may be quite simple. Perhaps it is to make us dependent—to produce a situation in which we believe that all we are and all we could become is dependent on the perpetuation of the status quo in our particular state. When we combine the social services State with the welfare State we have the ingredients of a potent cocktail to mold the values of citizens to make acting against the State a mortal sin and acting in its favor is a moral duty.

Returning to Gordon Tullock, we can imagine that he was taught, as was I, that our country, the United States of America, was prosperous because of our governmental system, and that we lived in a free country. Tullock was only 7 when the Great Depression began and would have been subjected at an impressionable age to all of the New Deal propaganda and may have even benefited from some of the programs. Even though he claims in the essay that he "wasn't even enthusiastic about the war," we can imagine that when he was drafted (Levy & Pert, p. 4) to refuse would have meant prison and/or dishonor. It wasn't his genes that made him ready to kill or be killed by people he had never met who were across an ocean and thousands of miles from his home of Rockford, Illinois—it was his values.

Now, I confess, genes may have an influence on values; but Tullock, although he had read Ludwig von Mises's Human Action (three times!) (Levy & Peart, p. 4), did not first establish that action depends on values and preferences and then speculate about how those values and preferences might have been affected by our physical evolutionary history as opposed to our psychological development.

2015 Levy, D. and Peart, S., Gordon Tullock and Karl Popper: Their Correspondence

Mises and Popper on Action

 Today the Ludwig von Mises Institute published my short article, "Mises and Popper on Action," a result of my joint project with Rafe Champion to explore the synergy between Popper and the Austrians (The Austrian School of Economics as a Popperian Metaphysical Research Programme).

If two schools of thought seem to be not only right, but incompatible, there are only two choices: 1) one or both of them are wrong; or 2) their differences may be resolved through semantic reconciliation and the discarding of mistakes that are of minor consequence. Rafe and I have been on the latter path for some time and hope our work encourages others to take the same path.

The Trouble With "Popperians"

Introduction

In recent months I have come into increasing intellectual conflict with a number of Popperians—people who embrace Karl Popper's philosophy of science and, worse, his politics—and now seek to identify some of the issues from my point of view. This is a difficult task for me, as I have actually written a couple of posts here (not as many as I had originally intended) while self-identifying as a Popperian. At this point I must reject that label in favor of considering myself a critical rationalist who largely accepts Austrian economics, especially as espoused by Ludwig von Mises. This acceptance rests on the idea that some truths really are self-evident, including truths that Sir Karl himself uttered, like "All things living are in search of a better world," a statement that may be considered a broadening generalization to all organisms of Mises's definition/axiom of human action.

Note that the following observations do not apply to all Popperians and that not every Popperian exhibits all of the negative characteristics that I identify. Popperians are individuals and must be treated as such, usually being a mix of error and truth as are the rest of us.

A Different Flavor of Positivist

Popper rejected the idea that he was just a different flavor of positivist—a falsificationist rather than a verificationist. However, Popperians generally fall into this category, ignoring Popper's writings on metaphysical research programs, which, while subject to criticism, could not be falsified.

Although Popper wrote almost exclusively about metaphysics and its application to real world problems, Popperians tend to see everything as empirical. The one self-evident truth that Popperians seem to accept is that there are no self-evident truths—in spite of the requirement that theories be internally consistent.

Critics Rather than Problem Solvers

Popperians seem to be heavy on criticism and light on problem solving. They tend to attack, criticize, dismiss, and mock tentative theories while rarely attempting to generate new helpful conjectures themselves. This behavior is evident in their constant efforts to discredit Austrian school economics while failing to offer an alternative. They declare it to be unfalsifiable and, therefore, unscientific, ignoring the fact that many positivist economists have tried and failed to produce any universal statements that may be tested.

This problem is actually addressed by Popper when he writes in the preface to The Poverty of Historicism (p x-xi): 

I think that it is convincing in itself: if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate to-day what we shall know only tomorrow... 

This argument, being purely logical, applies to scientific predictors of any complexity, including 'societies' of interacting predictors. But this means that no society can predict, scientifically, its own future states of knowledge. [emphasis in original]

Therefore, from economic theory we can expect explanation, but not prediction. And without prediction we have criticism, but not empirical falsification. 

Popper as a God

Many Popperians see Popper as Revealer of Truth who should guide us in all respects, and that the world may be saved through recognition of these truths. I think this is fallacious, as he is a revealer of a number of truths that actually do guide us. In other words, he explains the process by which knowledge—in his terms, objective knowledge—is produced through the process of problem solving by conjecture and refutation. It is true that the knowledge of this process may improve our capabilities in applying it, but if Popper is right, it is the process we—and all living things—have been using all along. I hasten to point out that these truths are metaphysical—they are not subject to empirical refutation and are, therefore, not science. They are, of course, subject to criticism and are still the subject of controversy to this day.

Treating Popper as a god makes those who criticize Popper or advocate approaches that seem to contradict his, heretics or worse; and by implication, wrong. For example, Mises's epistemology has been the subject of many papers and criticisms, primarily on the basis of empiricism. His claim that economic theory is a priori and cannot be falsified by empirical data is attacked by mainstream economists and Popperians alike, although economists like Hutchison simply bewail the lack of empirical tests of universal statements in economic theory while offering no alternative.

Failure to Apply Principals Popper Himself Advocated

Popperians tend to ignore Popper's rationality principle and situational analysis in engaging in argument. For example, they are quick to take Mises's suggestion that to rule his works as non-science, as a Popperian generally would, is a "verbal quibble," as evidence that Mises is simply ignorant of Popper's work or stupid. They do not recognize Mises's lifelong battle against the positivists in which an identification of his economic work as non-science would have meant its declaration by the positivists as non-sense.

In addition, although Popper suggested we should not argue over words, Popperians do not seem to be willing to grant Mises's use of the word "science," most likely meant as "organized knowledge." They fail to recognize the fact that Mises was already well-established, having published his groundbreaking Theory of Money and Credit in 1912, when Popper was 10—almost 25 years before Logik der Forschung. That his understanding of a word would be different from one Popper had himself created is hardly surprising.

Conclusion

Popperians are largely a politically confused bunch, as was Popper. Jeremy Shearmur wrote, in The Political Thought of Karl Popper (122), "I do not know what real-world institutions could even approximate to by playing the kind of role that [Popper] would be asking of them.” In fact, Popper's political thinking does not seem to rise much above what I learned in high school civics class, consisting mostly of platitudes about open discussion and criticism, after which the piecemeal social engineers impose their will and somehow, assess their success.

Without attitudes that are more akin to that of Popper himself, Popperians are likely to be impediments to, rather than facilitators of, progress.

Karl Popper's "Virus"

 In The Poverty of Historicism, while talking about the uncertainty of progress, Karl Popper wrote "For we cannot exclude the logical possibility, say, of a bacterium or virus that spreads a wish for Nirvana" (1957, p 157). What is interesting is that Popper was infected with this virus—initially, Marxism, gradually decreasing in virility to socialism and then interventionism.

In 1914, at the age of 12, Popper read Edward Bellamy's utopian novel, Looking Backward:2000-1887 (Hacohen, 2000, p 67-68); and, without guidance, it is hard to believe that he would have been able to engage with it critically. In fact, in his intellectual autobiography, he criticizes himself for his uncritical acceptance of Marxism (1982, 33-34). In that same book he demonstrates that while into his seventies he has still not rid himself of the disease, writing "... if there could be such a thing as socialism combined with personal liberty, I would be a socialist still" (36).

As far as I know, Popper, while sometimes mentioning free markets positively, never condemned socialism for its negative economic consequences that have resulted each time it has been tried. Even the voluntary socialist experiments of the 19th century (e.g. by adherents of Owenism in the U.S.) and of Zionists in Israel have been, if not outright failures, difficult to sustain. Perhaps his rejection of economism—the idea that economic welfare is a guide for social policy and a characteristic he identified in Marx's writing— led him to believe that such a criticism was unnecessary and would reduce him to Marx's level.

The failure of Popper to embrace the economics of Mises and Hayek has led to the perpetuation of error, most visibly in the person of George Soros, and put humanity at risk of another dark age. Edward Bellamy would be astonished.

Hacohen, M. H. (2000). Karl Popper — The Formative Years, 1902-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Popper, K. R. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon Press.

Popper, K. R. ([1976] 1982). Unended Quest. La Salle: Open Court.

Are Societal Structures Really "… the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design?"

This phrase from Adam Ferguson (quote in context here) is bandied about quite a bit by supporters of markets and, specifically, in the context of Friedrich Hayek's views of markets and society. The phrase brings to mind the inductivist view that science proceeds first by observations–"just observe." However, in the case of creating social structures, "just act." This formulation can lead one to think that in science any random observation can lead to knowledge, or in society, any action will contribute to the spontaneous order. Such thinking denigrates the individual and minimizes such achievements as Newton's laws of motion and Mises's work on socialism's calculation problem.

If we accept Mises's definition of human action, "purposeful behavior" (Human Action, p 11), we take it that each action is rational and aimed at a certain end (this is not to say that impulsive or instinctual actions involve thought processes, but that the ones that concern us in economics and social interaction do). Therefore we can say that each action is designed by the individual for a specific purpose. When individuals act with a purpose in mind they are supported by the entire background of biological and societal evolution that preceded them. For that reason, actions are not random but are stochasticly targeted in the sense Denis Noble describes in Dance to the Tune of Life (194-197), varying only part of the theoretical structure.

In acting, each person impinges upon the plans of others. As each person adjusts their plans to mesh with others' their actions produce effects that feed back into the system, producing new effects unanticipated by the original actors. These new effects produce plan revisions, and so on. The pattern is the same as Karl Popper's tetradic schema:

P₁ → TT → EE → P₂

 Where P₁ is the initial problem state, TT is a tentative solution or theory, EE is the error-elimination process applied to the theory, and P₂ represents the new problem state that has been generated by the process.

This concise representation is simply that of a Darwinian or evolutionary approach to knowledge, reflecting the iterative process of markets that is so foreign to the state and political governance.

New knowledge is created at the frontier by trial-and-error based upon what we currently believe to be true. Individuals produce the mutations to our theories–scientific and social–that make progress possible. These mutations are tested against reality and retained or discarded based on the results. Sometimes, when problems with an accepted theory become too great science takes a step back, and we discover we "know what ain't so."

At this moment in history, it appears that what we are in such a position with economics and society. In economics we are in the grips of the neoclassical synthesis, which provides an intellectual argument for the state, an institution that already resists falsification through power and violence. In society the failed arguments of natural rights have opened the floodgates to identity politics and the intellectually sterile ad hoc strategy of resistance to it. It would seem that we are heading for a giant reset in which one hopes for a rethinking of the whole project of governance resulting in institutions developed through the trial-and-error of what I have called evolutionary liberalism. Only then might we have Peace on Earth.

A Popperian View of The Selfish Gene

The Selfish Gene (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

The Problem

Richard Dawkins, in the "Preface to the 1976 edition" of The Selfish Gene wrote:

We are survival machines—robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment. Though I have known it for many years, I never seem to get fully used to it. (1989, v)

Although I never finished the book, I read enough of it years ago to understand, and accept, what Dawkins was selling—that these inanimate molecules were selfishly controlling evolution.

I believed this narrative for many years—actually, until recently. Then, having become ever more familiar with Karl Popper's philosophy and his evolutionary epistemology, I came to believe Dawkins's narrative was false for reasons I will attempt to explain.

For those readers who are not familiar with Popper's work, some introductory remarks are in order. For a wider review of Popper's most important works, see Rafe Champion's Popper: The Champion Guides.

The Tetradic Schema

Popper expressed his evolutionary, trial-and-error epistemology in a "tetradic schema":

     P₁ → TS → EE → P₂

This schema may be read as Problem situation 1 produces Tentative Solutions that undergo Error Elimination, leading to the new Problem situation 2. The schema represents an infinite process, as each new P₂ becomes a new P₁. Note that TS may represent an array of possible solutions.

Popper linked his thinking to Darwinian evolution in his early works, writing in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, "We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other theories; the one, which by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive" (1959, 108). In his  "Of Clouds and Clocks," Popper made the connection between his tetradic schema and evolution, writing that it describes "the fundamental evolutionary sequence of events" (1972, 243).

Three Worlds

Popper divided the world into three categories:

1. World 1: the world of physical objects.
2. World 2: the world of mental states.
3. World 3: the world of objective—that is, intersubjectively criticizable—knowledge.

Much as Mises discussed action in the context of humans, Popper focused on the human component of these categories, while acknowledging a glimmer of world 3 in the preconscious animals. Examples of the latter would be a spider's web (1972, 112) or a bird's nest (1972, 117). He did assert a connection between animal knowledge and genetic information:

This statement of the situation is meant to describe how knowledge really grows. It is not meant metaphorically, though of course it makes use of metaphors. The theory of knowledge which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian theory of the growth of knowledge. From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth of knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in our tentative solutions. (1972, 261)

World 3 in a human context contains the consciously-constructed results of conjecture and refutation that Popper called objective knowledge. For the process of refutation or error correction, the conjectures being evaluated must be in a form to be criticized. For that reason, world 3 objects are generally represented in world 1 objects like books or recordings. I believe, in the case of humans, they may also be represented in myths and ballads that are passed on through retelling and memory.

Genetic Dualism

In "Evolution and the Tree of Knowledge" (1972, p 256-284) Popper proposes a conjecture:

"The problem to be solved by [my conjecture] is the old problem of orthogenesis versus accidental and independent mutation—Samuel Butler's problem of luck or cunning. It arises from the difficulty of understanding how a complicated organ, such as the eye, can ever result from the purely accidental co-operation of independent mutations.
"Briefly, my solution of the problem consists in the hypothesis that in many if not all of those organisms whose evolution gives rise to our problem—they may include perhaps some very low organisms—we may distinguish more or less sharply [at least] two distinct parts: roughly speaking a behavior-controlling part like the central nervous system of the higher animals, and an executive part like the sense organs and the limbs, together with their sustaining structures." (p 273)

Popper calls this conjecture "genetic dualism" and suggests that it "strongly resembles mind-body dualism."

In the cases which we wish to explain, certain inherited dispositions or propensities like those of self-preservation, seeking food, avoiding dangers, acquiring skills by imitation, and so on, may be regarded as subject to mutations that do not as a rule induce any significant change in any organs of the body, including the sense organs, except those organs (if any) which are the genetic carriers of the dispositions or propensities referred to. (p 273)

Popper goes on to explain that changes in the executive part that occur independently of the behavior-controlling part are likely to be unfavorable, while changes in the behavior-controlling part prepare the way for taking advantage of later changes in the executive part. He concludes, now referring to the behavior-controlling part as the "central propensity structure":

Once a new aim or tendency or disposition, or a new skill, or a new way of behaving has evolved in the central propensity structure, this fact will influence the effects of natural selection in such a way that previous unfavourable (though potentially favourable) mutations become actually favourable if they support the newly established tendency. But this means that the evolution of the executive organs will become directed by that tendency or aim, and thus 'goal-directed'. [emphasis in original] (p 278)

If we consider the context of all known living organisms, the possibility that world 3 is not simply a human phenomenon, and the conjecture of genetic dualism we find an argument against Dawkins's theory.

Are We Slaves of Libraries*?

Just as humans need books, and by extrapolation, libraries, to pass on knowledge, so too must cells have the capability to encode their knowledge to pass on an organism's characteristics. To do so, cellular processes must have discovered or even created DNA and used it to store genetic information. Perhaps this discovery occurred through random combination, or through some method yet to be understood that might be called "unconscious intelligence." In relation to the latter there are a number of competing hypotheses including vitalism, panpsychism, holism, etc., all of which are speculative and might be called "skyhooks" by the likes of Daniel Dennett. The primary point here is that the acting or behavior-controlling part is cellular processes, while genes fulfill the role of the executive part. Applying Popper's conjecture to cells, genes would be relegated to a passive role in the same relationship to cellular processes and libraries are to humans. The question then becomes, are we slaves of libraries?

In Denis Noble's book, The Music of Life, he presents two possible alternatives for genes. The Dawkins version is that living things are the slaves of genes, while the other is that genes are the prisoners of organisms. Each of these choices seems somewhat silly (as Denis Noble has informed me, they were meant to be, as alternatives between which there was no way to choose through experiment). After all, are we slaves of our libraries, or are libraries our prisoners? I would suggest that neither is the case, and that we create libraries as world 3 extensions of ourselves with which we interact, enhancing our survival (Popper, 1994).

Evidence for Genetic Dualism

In the second part of the Homage to Darwin debate held at Oxford (41:36) (also documented in (MacAllister, 2009, p 16)) Noble points out that implanting a genome of one species in the egg cell from another is only able to develop so far before "freezing."

There are extremely few cases of cross species cloning that lead to a living organism. What that tells me is that the genetic 'program' --if we can use that metaphor--lies as much in the cell as in the genome.

I suspect that this observation is in agreement with Popper's genetic dualism in that the control apparatus, the cellular processes, are not able to process the DNA presented to them.

Conclusion

Whatever Dawkins may have thought he was doing when he wrote The Selfish Gene, he fostered a belief that there was some control of evolution exhibited by genes. But when we apply Popper's thinking to the problem, we come to a completely different conclusion—that cellular processes are the world 2 behavior-controlling part that makes evolution appear goal-directed while the world 1 object, DNA, performs the world 3, "library" function.

*I use the word "libraries" to represent those world 3 objects that are represented in world 1 form.

MacAllister, James (2009). "A Commentary on Homage to Darwin Debate." Retrieved June 5, 2018 from NanoPDF: https://nanopdf.com/download/homageto-darwin-debate-commentary_pdf.
Popper, Karl R., (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Popper, Karl R., (1972). Objective Knowledge. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press.
Popper, Karl R., (1994). Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem: In defence of interaction. (M. A. Notturno, Ed.), London: Routledge.

Evolutionary Liberalism

Although this blog is named "The Radical Liberal," my thinking has taken a decidedly evolutionary turn. In a sense that turn is even more radical, but I think that it is time for me to attach a more descriptive term than "radical" to this liberalism—"evolutionary."

The characteristics of evolutionary liberalism are that it embraces universal Darwinism and takes trial-and-error, evolutionary learning as the only way forward for humanity. It argues that the pursuit of such learning is inhibited by what people call "government" or "the state"—that the state is itself a failed experiment.

The social embodiment of this learning process is what is generally called "the market," discussed previously in my paper "Let Go and Let the Market," referenced in another post on this blog. The ideas in that paper have been developed further, and money profit identified as the selection mechanism for societal evolution.

The philosophy of evolutionary liberalism is heavily influenced by the scientific philosophy of Karl R. Popper (not his generally-flawed political and economic thinking) and the economics of the Austrian school, as elucidated by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. These thinkers are influences and there is no argument that they would agree with or support evolutionary liberalism. This is not a project to argue about what they thought, but to use their work as inspiration for ever bolder conjectures.

I am quite sure that many people are circling around these ideas, including Matt Ridley and Daniel Dennett. Although they are far more well known and knowledgeable than I, they seem to have missed the basic problem of the state and its "solution." When it comes to them, or other widely-read thinkers, we might have a renaissance of true liberalism.

Contra Hayek, Cultural Evolution IS Darwinian

In Hayek's The Fatal Conceit (1988) there is a section titled "The Mechanism of Cultural Evolution Is Not
Darwinian." Within the section Hayek takes the position that Darwinian theory applies only to biological and not cultural evolution. He writes that "cultural evolution simulates Lamarkism" (25).

However, when we take an abstract view of Darwinism—variation, selection, and retention—we see that Hayek is mistaken. The problem of Lamarkism is not that characteristics are acquired, as characteristics resulting from mutations are also acquired; but that there is no mechanism of retention. Rather than DNA, it is the institutions of society that pass on the mutations of society—the new ideas, technologies, and customs. The mechanism of cultural retention is what Karl Popper called World 3 (1972).

The mention of World 3 prompts the suggestion that DNA is also a World 3 phenomenon created by processes in the cell for purposes of retention. Where this suggestion leads is anybody's guess.

Bibliography

Hayek, F.A., 1988, The Fatal Conceit, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Popper, K.R., 1972, "On the Theory of the Objective Mind" in Objective Knowledge, London, Oxford University Press, 153-190.

Karl Popper's Three Worlds and "The Market"

Introduction

Talking about "the market" in a more generalized way – that is, one which includes all of the living world and nonconsensual interactions that occur between humans and between species – requires increased semantic clarity. In order to achieve this increased clarity Karl Popper's three worlds can be used as a model. After introducing a terminology that parallels that of Popper its potential utility is discussed.

Three Worlds, Three Markets

English: Karl Popper in 1990. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In discussing "the market" it is difficult to transmit a number of different meanings that depend on the context, e.g., one that is consensual vs. nonconsensual or one that is human versus one that is inter-species. These different meanings are reminiscent of Popper's three worlds, and his concepts are used to introduce a parallel analog relating to markets.

Firstly, there is the market that is composed of the physical world. As Popper says, in describing world 1:

There is, first, the world that consists of physical bodies: of stones and of stars; of plants and of animals; but also of radiation, and of other forms of physical energy. I will call this physical world ‘world 1’. (1978, 143)

This market consists of all of the interactions, physical and/or chemical, that occur in the physical world. These interactions, as far as we know, are not guided by conjectural knowledge. This physical market is called "market 1".

Market 1 can be subdivided into the living and non-living, as Popper suggests:

If we so wish, we can subdivide the physical world 1 into the world of non-living physical objects and into the world of living things, of biological objects; though the distinction is not sharp. (1978, 143)

Secondly, there is the market of conjectural knowledge. This description might be thought to augment Popper's world 2, which he described as follows:

There is, secondly, the mental or psychological world, the world of our feelings of pain and of pleasure, of our thoughts, of our decisions, of our perceptions and our observations; in other words, the world of mental or psychological states or processes, or of subjective experiences. I will call it ‘world 2’. (1978, 143)

Popper's view is expanded to include the conjectural knowledge encoded in DNA or any similar, yet-to-be-discovered encoding system. This market is called "market 2".

Again, market 2 can be subdivided following Popper's prescription:

World 2 could be subdivided in various ways. We can distinguish, if we wish, fully conscious experiences from dreams, or from subconscious experiences. Or we can distinguish human consciousness from animal consciousness. (1978, 143)

Thirdly, there is the market of expressed knowledge. This market consists of the actions taken based on the conjectural knowledge of market 2. Popper describes world 3 as follows:

By world 3 I mean the world of the products of the human mind, such as languages; tales and stories and religious myths; scientific conjectures or theories, and mathematical constructions; songs and symphonies; paintings and sculptures. But also aeroplanes and airports and other feats of engineering. (1978, 144)

In striking contrast to his descriptions of worlds 1 and 2, Popper includes only "the products of the human mind" (emphasis added). Omitting the non-human expressed knowledge of plants and animals, including everything from the behavior of the E. coli bacterium (Cziko, 1995, 120) to the engineering feats of the Great Sequoias and honey bees, clearly damages the consistency of the discussion if nothing else. As Popper might agree, these expressions of world 2 cannot be criticized without becoming objects in world 3, where criticism is based on evolutionary fit. Notably, this form of criticism also affects world 2 as Popper framed it, culling those living systems whose conjectural knowledge is not up to the task.

With the addition of these non-human components this market is called "market 3". Clearly, the human component of market 3 is where business plans are exposed to the criticisms of consumers, with the result that the objects that appear in market 1 will be created and the conjectural knowledge of market 2 will be modified.

Popper suggests some subdivisions to world 3:

It would be easy to distinguish a number of different worlds within what I call world 3. We could distinguish the world of science from the world of fiction; and the world of music and the world of art from the world of engineering. (1978, 144)

Market 3 contains some additional markets – the markets of successful and unsuccessful expressed knowledge, and the markets of voluntarily and involuntarily expressed knowledge. These distinctions are blurred and the two sets definitely overlap.

Conclusion

Where does the forgoing discussion get us? Most importantly, it enables us to talk about society in a non-religious way that unifies it with the rest of the living world. With it we become aware of a wider range of questions that are rarely even asked. Why is killing animals or plants acceptable while killing humans is not? Why is the killing of some humans supported or even demanded? Why is the enslaving of animals widely practiced while enslaving humans is considered barbarous? Would a super-human species treat us more like we treat animals or more like we treat each other?

Without an ability to explore these questions in a value-free manner we cannot identify man's position in the universe and investigate what environment is most conducive to his flourishing. Hopefully, we will also be able to discern the difference between conjectural knowledge that is universally applicable and that which is dependent on time and place.

Bibliography

Cziko, G. (1995). Without Miracles: Universal Selection Theory and the Second Darwinian Revolution. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Popper, K. R. (1978), "Three Worlds", In The Tanner Lecture on Human Values (Delivered at The University of Michigan on April 7, 1978). (pp. 143-167). Retrieved November 26, 2013 from http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/popper80.pdf.

In Support of Methodological Monism

The appeal of methodological monism – as Popper put it, "the view that all theoretical or generalizing sciences make use of the same method, whether they are natural or social sciences" (1957, 130) – seems undeniable (think Occam's Razor), and it has a number of supporters.¹ On the other hand, some in the social sciences – notably members of the Austrian school of economics – suggest methodological dualism or, in the case of Bruce Caldwell (Caldwell, 1982), even methodological pluralism. It appears that these different camps are difficult to reconcile, and to this point no resolution has been found.

English: Karl Popper in 1990. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

When difficulties of this sort arise – where there exist multiple views, all seemingly reasonable, yet
irreconcilable – it is possible that a solution may be found in appealing to a higher level of abstraction. In this case we look to Karl R. Popper's formalization of the scientific method in the following schema (Popper, 1972, 119):

P₁ → TT → EE → P₂

Where P₁ is the initial problem state, TT is a tentative solution or theory, EE is the error-elimination process applied to the theory, and P₂ represents the new problem state that has been generated by the process. This concise representation is simply that of a Darwinian or evolutionary approach to knowledge.

In this discussion our focus is on the error-elimination step. If one thinks of Popper's formulation as "the method", the error-elimination step may be modified as circumstances warrant without altering that method. Popper also referred to this step as "attempted elimination through critical discussion" (1999, 13-4). To acquire new knowledge, we always use this method, substituting the appropriate critical component.² With this understanding we may actually suggest that Bruce Caldwell is a methodological monist, as he specifically states that his reason for supporting methodological pluralism is that theories require different forms of criticism (Caldwell, 1982, 1-2).

English: Ludwig von Mises in his library (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Ludwig von Mises, a strong advocate of methodological dualism (1969, 1-2),³ presents a slightly more difficult case. His dualism differentiated the method in the social sciences from that of the physical sciences by asserting that its axioms were a priori true,⁴ and that criticisms of the logic used to deduce its theorems were the best method of refuting them. A clarification of Mises's approach (Smith, 1996),
 explicity identifying and defending its axioms as synthetic rather than analytic, has tied it more closely to the real world. This clarification has increased the credibility of the approach even though tentative theories, in Popper's view, need no justification. To illustrate Mises's emphasis on criticism we offer the following quote:

Man is not infallible. He searches for truth – that is, for the most adequate comprehension of reality as far as the structure of his mind and reason makes it accessible to him. Man can never become omniscient. He can never be absolutely certain that his inquiries were not misled and that what he considers as certain truth is not error. All that man can do is submit all his theories again and again to the most critical reexamination. This means for the economist to trace back all theorems to their unquestionable and certain ultimate basis, the category of human action, and to test by the most careful scrutiny all assumptions and inferences leading from this bases to the theorem under examination. It cannot be contended that this procedure is a guarantee against error. But it is undoubtedly the most effective method of avoiding error. (Mises, 1966, 68)

The critical component in the method is composed of the examination of premises and validation of logic.

When viewed in this more abstract light, Mises's method fits Popper's formulation and does not contradict methodological monism. This fact is comforting as we suspect that the idea that there is only one fundamental method of obtaining knowledge is itself an a priori truth.

In a previous post we suggested that Mises was incorrect in claiming that economics was a subject unconnected with any other science, linking the action axiom with Popper's suggestion that "all life is problem solving" and to the science of biology. Here we have claimed that Mises's method fully complies with the scientific method as formulated by Popper, and that it is only the use of an appropriately different approach to error elimination or criticism that differentiates it from the physical sciences. If we have succeeded in our project it seems clear that economic methodology, as described and practiced by Ludwig von Mises, is scientific, and that the resulting discipline of economics is science.

Footnotes

¹ See (Blaug, 1992, 42-47), (Wilson, 1998), and (Cziko, 1995).
² I am grateful to Rafe Champion for bringing this point home.
³ For Mises's discussion of his method see (2003), (1966, 1-142), (1969) and (2006). For discussions by others, see (Boettke, 1998), (Boettke, 2012), (Kirzner, 2001, 69-92), and (Selgin, 1990, 11-18),
⁴ Mises recognized the observational, i.e. synthetic, component of his axiom (Kirzner, 2001, 88-9).

Bibliography

Blaug, M. (1992). The Methodology of Economics: Or how economists explain (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boettke, P. J. (1998). Ludwig von Mises. In J. Davis, D. W. Hands, & U. Mäki (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Methodology (pp. 534-40). Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing. Retrieved October 24, 2013, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1531088

Boettke, P. J. (2012). Was Mises Right? In P. J. Boettke, Living Economics: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow (pp. 192-212). Oakland, California: The Independent Institute.

Caldwell, B. (1982). Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Cziko, G. (1995). Without Miracles: Universal Selection Theory and the Second Darwinian Revolution. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Kirzner, I. M. (2001). Ludwig von Mises. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books.

Mises, L. v. (1966). Human Action: A treatise on economics (3rd ed.). Chicago: Henry Regnery.

Mises, L. v. (1969). Theory and History: An interpretation of social and economic evolution. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House.

Mises, L. v. (2003). Epistemological Problems of Economics (3rd ed.). Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Mises, L. v. (2006). The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An essay on method (2nd ed.). Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund.

Popper, K. R. (1957). The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: The Beacon Press.

Popper, K. R. (1972). Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject. In K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (pp. 106-52). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Popper, K. R. (1999). The logic and evolution of scientific theory. In K. R. Popper, All Life is Problem Solving (pp. 3-22). London: Routledge.

Selgin, G. A. (1990). Praxeology and Understanding: An analysis of the controversy in Austrian economics. Auburn, Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Smith, B. (1996, Spring). In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 12(1), 179-192.

Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Ludwig von Mises, the Action Axiom, and Biology

Introduction

In the pursuit of science little can be said to be of greater importance than the epistemology employed.  In this regard the epistemology of the Austrian School of economic thought has been roundly criticized and rejected by mainstream economists.¹  This reaction was primarily due to Ludwig von Mises's firm stand on apriorism and the claim that praxeology, of which economics was the most developed discipline, was a new science, unconnected to previously acquired knowledge (Mises, 1966, 1-10).

English: Ludwig von Mises in his library (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Much of the Austrian literature on epistemology since Mises's exposition² has been to explain and defend, ever more loudly and vociferously, apriorism and the apodictic certainty of conclusions derived from Mises's action axiom.  A notable exception to that literature is Barry Smith's tract on fallible apriorism (1996), which elaborated and extended Rothbard's thesis (1957) by showing that a priori knowledge, although independent of observation, is derived from observation and, hence, is synthetic a priori knowledge.

With Smith's introduction of fallibilism into Mises's system, some of the distance between it and Karl Popper's concept of conjectural knowledge was reduced.  This reconciliation has been visible in a number of efforts that attempt to bring Mises's approach into the methodological housing of Popper and other philosophers of science, notably Imre Lakatos.³  More on that in another post; but, at this moment we have another issue to address — Mises's claim that economics, and its encompassing science, praxeology, are new sciences unconnected with previous knowledge.  This claim did not sit well with those who believe all knowledge to be connected and do not have an anthropocentric view of the universe.

The Origins of Action

Mises went to great lengths to deny that human action is in any way related to action in our evolutionary ancestors, even stating that "The newborn child is not an acting being," and that "Beings of human descent who either from birth or from acquired defects are unchangeably unfit for any action... are practically not human" (1966, 14).  To do so seems to strike at the very notion that we have evolved from species that have less flexibility than we, and from whom we do not stand apart in the universe.  In this context Mises formulated what has become known as the action axiom — man acts, aiming at the improvement of his situation relative to his values (1966, 13-14).

English: Karl Popper in 1990. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

In an address given in 1967, Karl Popper made a more general statement — that "Animals, and even plants, are problem-solvers" (1972, 145).  The idea was later stated more simply as "All life is problem solving" (1999, 100).  By this statement he meant that each life form represented, either anatomically or behaviorally, a hypothetical solution to the problem of its environment. Darwinian evolution supplied the criticism or falsification of that hypothesis.

At this point we must ask, "what problem is being solved?"  The answer lies in the action axiom — the problem of improving the situation, or survivability, of the organism.  Each organism acts, in the way it understands, to improve its situation.⁴  It appears that Popper's statement stands as a powerful axiom — possibly the basic axiom of biology — in support of Mises's more specific one and reveals biology as the epistemological basis of economics.  In fact economics is not separated from all of the other sciences, but is an outgrowth of biology.

This conclusion would most likely suit Edward O. Wilson who said "It is in biology and psychology that economists and other social scientists will find the premises needed to fashion more predictive models, just as it was in physics and chemistry that researchers found premises that upgraded biology" (1998, 206); however, Wilson did not expect the basic premise to come from a philosopher or support the Austrian methodological approach.

We do not argue here that economics has that much to learn from biology, although Wilson certainly believes it does.  Economics is clearly a human science — the most fundamental theorems depend on activities that are observable only in humans.  What we do argue is that biology supplies an axiom that is fundamental to all life that strengthens Mises's action axiom, supporting it with what Rothbard would have called a "law of reality rather than a law of thought" (1957).

At this point we must question why Hayek did not see this connection.  He knew, and was friends with, both Mises and Popper, as well as having a deep understanding of their work.  He also came from a family of biologists.  His father was a serious botanist as well as being a doctor, and Hayek helped him with botanical work and attended society meetings (Ebenstein, 2001).  At this point we can only speculate, but he may have seen Mises's and Popper's works as irreconcilable and never even contemplated a reconciliation of their views.  Perhaps he was reluctant to start down a path that could have resulted in the loss of one or both of his closest intellectual associates.  In any case, it is unfortunate that a person of his stature did not complete Mises's work by linking economics with the rest of knowledge.

Conclusion

With the modification of Mises's viewpoint on action yet another objection to the epistemology of the Austrian School can be overcome.  This modification is hardly a blow to Mises's overall system as it supports, rather than rejects, his action axiom.  At the same time it ties economics more closely to the sciences, a goal that we can only believe Mises would have supported.

¹ See (Blaug, 1980, 81-2) and (Samuelson, 1964, 736).
² Mises wrote extensively on methodology and epistemology, producing a volume of essays in 1933 that was later translated into English (Mises, 1960) and his final published book (Mises, 1962).
³ See (Champion, 2013), (Di Iorio, 2008) and (Rizzo, 1983).
⁴ This is not to say that there is some super-human intelligence in operation, but that natural processes have been evolutionarily selected that make the organism's choices the most likely to succeed.

Bibliography

Blaug, M. (1992). The Methodology of Economics: Or how economists explain (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Champion, R. (2013, March 11). The Common Ground of Parsons, Mises and Popper in the 1930s: The Action Frame of Reference, Praxeology and Situational Analysis. Retrieved from the Rathouse: the philosophy site of rafe champion: http://www.the-rathouse.com/EvenMoreAustrianProgram/Convergence.html

Di Iorio, F. (2008). Apriorism and Fallibilism: Mises and Popper on the Explanation of Action and Social Phenomena. Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine(2). Retrieved March 11, 2013, from http://www.imtlucca.it/whats_new/_seminars_docs/000195-Di_Iorio_MISES_and_POPPER.pdf

Ebenstein, A. (2001). Friedrich Hayek: A Biography. New York: Palgrave for St. Martin's Press.

Mises, L. v. (1960). Epistemological Problems of Economics. (G. Reisman, Trans.) Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.

Mises, L. v. (1962). The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.

Mises, L. v. (1966). Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (3rd revised ed.). Chicago: Henry Regnery.

Popper, K.R. (1972). Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject. In K.R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (pp. 106-52). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rothbard, M.N. (1957). In Defense of 'Extreme Apriorism'.Southern Economic Journal(23), 315-20.

Rizzo, M. J. (1983). Mises and Lakatos: A Reformulation of Austrian Methodology. In I. M. Kirzner (Ed.), Method, Process, and Austrian Economics: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises. New York: Lexington Books. Retrieved March 11, 2013, from http://mises.org/books/methodprocess.pdf

Samuelson, P.A. (1964, September). Theory and Realism: A Reply. The American Economic Review, 54(5), 736-9. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1818572

Smith, B. (1996, Spring). In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism. Journal of Libertarian Studies, 12(1), 179-192.

Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Related articles

• Mises' Sectarianism

In Defense of Karl Popper and Piecemeal Social Engineering

Karl Popper in 1990. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Karl R. Popper was one of the most influential philosophers of science in the 20^th century.  His ideas on inductivism and falsifiability transformed the philosophy of science, creating credibility when he turned his mind to the social sciences.  Over the course of his lifetime he moved from a strong commitment to social democracy to support for liberal democracy, possibly due to the influence of his longtime friend, Friedrich Hayek.

In The Open Society and Its Enemies Popper proposed something he called “piecemeal social engineering.”[1]  In this regime he suggested that governments implement small societal changes and then critically evaluate the results.  He also mentioned that private individuals and businesses were participants in this process saying:

Even a man who opens a new shop, or who reserves a ticket for the theatre, is carrying out a kind of social experiment on a small scale ;  and all our knowledge of social conditions is based on experience gained by making experiments of this kind.[2]

In the context that Popper suggested it most free market advocates would find his view of social engineering to be anathema; but if we view it critically and in the context of Popper’s more abstract ideas, specifically “evolutionary epistemology,” we can come to a different and positive conclusion.

Consider Bryan Magee’s representation of Popper’s view of problem solving in society when he says, “Because he regards living as first and foremost a process of problem-solving he wants societies which are conducive to problem-solving.”[3]  When Popper suggested that liberal democracies could legislate small changes in the societal structure, evaluate the results and either repeal or retain the changes he was arguing against utopian views and for such a society.  As such it was a significant advancement in thinking about societal changes and a sensible argument against all utopian schemes.  Unfortunately, Popper was naïve about the ability of governments, even those of liberal democracies, to evaluate the results of their actions and to learn from them.

Governments are unable to learn from their mistakes for a number of reasons:

1. The individuals supporting a specific experiment risk citizens’ resources, not their own.
2. In a mixed economy, government does pay market prices for the resources it consumes, but as a monopoly it forces the populace to pay arbitrary prices for the goods and services it provides.
3. There is no signal such as profit or loss that can inform the experimenters of their success or failure.  In fact, it is widely suggested that government should undertake projects that are “desired” but that generate losses.

In addition to the inability of governments to learn, they impose their experiments on the entire populace, eliminating the possibility of parallel, competitive experiments through which more progress could be made.
As mentioned earlier, Popper did suggest that businesses could, in effect, also participate in piecemeal social engineering by implementing different business plans and offering revised or different products.  He failed to realize that what seemed to him to be a minor component was in fact the most significant and could accomplish his goal of societal evolution more effectively.
The fact is that businesses in the free market have built-in mechanisms that signal difficulties and facilitate learning:

1. The individuals involved are risking their own or investors’ resources – resources that are freely given and are at risk in the project.  This risk factor dampens the enthusiasm for projects that appear fantastic or utopian as opposed to realistic.
2. Businesses charge prices that must reflect customers’ values.
3. If income minus expenses is negative that signals that the business’s inputs are not creating a value for consumers that justifies the consumption of resources.  The individuals involved must make the decision whether to continue to consume capital or abandon the project.

Businesses are naturally competitive and are generally unable to impose their plans on the population, making it possible for multiple plans to be executed simultaneously across various industries.

Thus, we can say that Popper’s idea – piecemeal experimentation with the expectation of finding problem solutions – was sensible, but his means – governments of liberal democracies – could not accomplish that end.  On the other hand, a society free of government intervention and based on profit and loss has the tools required to accomplish it.

---

[1] Popper, Karl R., The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume I: The Spell of Plato, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 158.
[2] Ibid, 162.
[3] Magee, Bryan, Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper, (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985), 75.

The Observational Evidence for a priori Knowledge

Karl Popper, the philosopher of science, quite clearly supports the concept of a priori knowledge. Not knowledge as in knowing the laws of gravitation, but knowledge as in knowing about and how to deal with gravitation.

In the essay "The Epistemological Position of Evolutionary Epistemolgy" in the essay collection All Life is Problem Solving, Popper suggests that life must know something about the universe in order to survive through even the first few minutes of its existence.

For the adaptation of life to its environment is a kind of knowledge. Without this minimal knowledge, life cannot survive.

The observable fact that life exists tells us that this knowledge, which Popper calls "genetically a priori," also exists.

Competition as a Discovery Procedure for Ethics

Friedrich Hayek wrote essays concerned with competition in a theoretical sense, e.g. "Competition as a Discovery Procedure," and in a pragmatic sense, e.g. "Denationalisation of Money." The first essay argues (among other things) that competition leads to discoveries of new knowledge that could not have been aimed at. The latter essay was written as a challenge to the monopolization of the monetary system and the resulting failure to create sound money by proposing the introduction of competitive currencies. It is time to challenge another monopoly of the state – that of the ethical or legal system – and suggest that competing ethical systems are the method by which we may approach an ever more sound system.

Ethical systems are generally presented as being handed down from God or derived in some way from human nature. Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard developed systems explicitly in the latter class. Andrew
J. Galambos claimed to derive an ethical system from science, a claim that may also be lumped in with theirs, being derived from the nature of volitional beings. These claims are not intended by the claimants to be subject to test, but are presented as systems to which people must adhere, even though the systems may be based upon free market, stateless societies (Rothbard's and Galambos's systems are members of this class while Ayn Rand retains the existence of the state).

Ethical systems, where they intersect with the state, produce legal systems that are imposed upon the inhabitants within the borders of a political entity. In the time of monarchy the legal system reflected the religion of the monarch and whatever concepts of justice the monarch held. In modern democracies the legal system is a reflection of the struggle between various groups and may reflect most fundamentally the views of the religious majority. The one system that attempts to reflect evolutionary market forces is English Common Law, but even in that case the discovery process is hampered by the fact that competition between courts is limited and petitioners may not choose the legal system by which a case will be tried. A free market in judicial services would harness the engine of competition in the quest for ethical systems that are more sound and responsive to the consumers' needs.

If individuals may enter into contracts with different companies providing judicial services reflecting different ethical systems (e.g. Christian, Rothbardian, Galambosian, Islamic, etc.) to resolve their disputes, defend or recover their property, etc., one can imagine that there would be a number of problems. But would these problems be greater than the problems that exist between countries
or, in the United States, between local state jurisdictions? Certainly the execution of a judgment or transfer of an alleged criminal between jurisdictions involves some process that would evolve between justice companies. If companies do not have reciprocal agreements, due to remoteness, neglect or aversion, it is possible that disputes that cross their boundaries will not be resolved, and a loss that might be covered by insurance will be incurred.

Each company may codify its ethical system and reference it in its advertising, along with endorsements from its satisfied customers. If a company has an attractive ethical system it can be expected to attract repeat customers and grow. Superior systems will be reproduced and inferior ones will die out. Better ways of handling cases will be sought, successes added and failures dropped, advancing the system using the same method as science.

In Karl Popper's parlance, each ethical system is a theory and is subject to falsification. The falsification method is its profitability. However, it must be remembered that a falsification of an ethical system, as it is a volitional creation, is subject to its circumstances. Certainly, an ethical system that many might find reasonable today would have found few customers in the depths of the Dark Ages. People's beliefs are essential in the discussion of human action, and change over time. So, it is clear that an ethical system introduced into the market "before its time" may fail, only to be rediscovered and retried successfully later.

If the state were to end its monopolization of the justice market, various ethical systems could flourish, some succeeding (generating profits) and some failing (generating losses). Through this system of competition, inferior systems could be weeded out and superior systems discovered.

Sources

F.A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure in The Essence of Hayek (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984) 254-265.

F.A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978).

Bryan Magee, Philosophy and the Real World: An Introduction to Karl Popper (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985).